"The Lidcombe Facility"
From the book "Wirraway to Hornet"

First discussions on the Pratt & Whitney R-1830 Twin Wasp engine began in early 1939, following the British Air Mission visit to Australia in March. The Mission recommended production of 180 Bristol Beauforts CAC was already in production with the Wasp and as the RAAF had ordered Hudson’s with the P&W Twin Wasp engine, it was suggested that production of this engine would be easier than setting up for a completely new power plant.

On May 24, 1939, the Minister for Supply and Development, R G. Casey (later Lord Casey), wrote to CAC with the information that Cabinet had decided to use the Bristol Taurus engine in all Australian Beaufort, and that CAC would be required to manufacture these. It was explained that while Cabinet acknowledged the views of CAC on the question of aircraft engine production, it was considered that the RAAF should standardise on the same equipment as the RAF where possible. The letter continued:

(i) That immediate steps be taken in respect of Bristol sleeve-valve engines by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation.
(ii) That we should not engage in the manufacture of twin-row Wasp engines - but that
(iii) If necessary, we should import such twin-row Wasp engines and spares as may be required for Lockheed Hudson aircraft.
(iv) The above decisions involve the possibility of importation of all Taurus engines necessary for the 180 Beaufort aircraft if it becomes clear that the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation will not be in a position to deliver Taurus engines in time.

This was strong stuff, clearly pointing out that if CAC did not measure up, all the engines would be imported. The tone became even stronger as it spelled out the principles laid down by the 1937 Imperial Conference, and continued:

The report of the British Air Mission which was adopted by the Commonwealth Government is a major step to give effect to the foregoing principles. In this scheme Australia has the opportunity to become the principal British centre of manufacture of certain important armaments east of Suez. The faith that Britain has shown in Australia's potential manufacturing capacity, in the shape of the substantial order for Beaufort aircraft, is an earnest of this.

In order to live up to our opportunities and to our responsibilities arising from the aircraft scheme, it is incumbent on us to put ourselves in a position to produce complete aircraft of a type that Britain requires for defence purposes for strategic points outside Australia, so that we can secure the advantages of large-scale production with lower costs. We have been informed that Britain will equip certain squadrons with the same type of general reconnaissance machine as used for the Royal Australian Air Force. This entails uniformity in type and the manufacture of the Bristol Taurus engine and possibly later, other and larger types of sleeve-valve engines

The War Years

The Government believes that we might, in the popular phrase be "biting off more than we can chew", if we were to attempt to tool up for the twin-row Wasp engine simultaneously with taking similar action for the production of the Taurus engine to fit in with the contemplated timetable of airframe manufacture, bearing in mind that our aim is to place ourselves as early as possible in a position of providing for our needs in an emergency, while at the same time pursuing a satisfactory long-range policy based on Australian self-sufficiency and Empire uniformity of design.

The earlier proposal to tool up for the twin-row Wasp was taken as the result of a desire for a measure of reinsurance against a contingency under which Taurus engines might not be forthcoming
However. The revised estimates now submitted by the agents of the Bristol Company on the firm basis of a quotation in regard to:

• Time of delivery of equipment, jigs and tools
• Period for establishment of factory fully equipped for production of Taurus engines;
• Cost of factory equipment;

Together with the fact that Taurus engines can be ordered abroad to cover the whole requirements for 180 airframes, with a break clause to provide for variation according to the progress of local production, are considered by the Government to warrant the change with the assurance that the situation from the defence aspect will be as satisfactory as under the previously contemplated arrangement. The Government's Air Force advisers concur with this view.'

It seems incredible that as late as mid-1939, the Australian Government and the RAAF were still convinced that Britain could supply all the nation's aviation needs - the visionary Essington Lewis had known five years earlier that it was just not so. The Government's thinking was probably more an example of the traditional blind faith with which Australians followed the motherland than an example of stupidity.

Officialdom's tenuous connection with reality was short-lived. In September the pressure of war on the British industry and problems shipping materials to Australia raised fresh doubts concerning supply of Bristol Taurus engines. The decision on the P&W engines was quickly reversed.

The Commonwealth Government proposed an engine manufacturing facility in Sydney, and CAC, with its experience with Pratt & Whitney and success in building Wasp engines in Melbourne, was given the task of running the new factory in November 1939. The same month saw CAC send four engineers to P&W at Hartford in Connecticut to plan for Twin Wasp production at the new factory. The engineers were Peter Schipper (seconded from P&W and already in Australia on the Wasp project) to determine machine tooling and equipment requirements, and H.E. (Ted) Moore to cover machining methods, Arthur Warmisharn on tooling and Dick Brooks on heat treatment and processing.

Lidcombe was chosen as the location and building began on the 15 acre site, which was later expanded to just over 20 acres. This was very much a Commonwealth Government organised and financed enterprise, with CAC responsible only for the technicalities of engine production and general management

On December 4, 1939, the CAC directors recommended to the Commonwealth Government that 50 R-1830 engines be purchased overseas, ahead of production. At the same time, orders for £284,000 worth of machine tools for Lidcombe and the purchase of some £30,000 worth of raw materials was authorised by the Government. As with the set‑up for the Wasp engine, universal machines that allowed flexibility and reduced costs were purchased.

Negotiations with P&W saw CAC granted exclusive rights to manufacture the engines for a lump sum payment of £95,000 plus £750 per engine produced, and six per cent of the value of spare parts manufactured. The licence, completed on November 15, 1939, was for five years, and permitted CAC to supply other members of the British Empire. Approval for the production of the engine in Australia had also to be obtained from the US Government.

The 1944 renewal of the licence agreement reduced royalty payment to just $250 per engine, plus one per cent of the value of spares manufactured, and included R-2800 parts manufactured until the end of the war or until January 1947. This renewal was for a two year period.

The decision to reverse the choice of the Taurus engine proved sound, as in May 1940, the British Government placed an embargo on the export of aircraft materials and equipment.

During the latter part of 1940, large numbers of tradesmen were sent down to Melbourne for instruction and training at Fishermen's Bend so that work could commence in Lidcombe as soon as the buildings were completed. Over 100 of these trainees were at the Bend in early 1941, a situation Wackett described as "..a temporary disadvantage".

Most of the Lidcombe buildings were finished when electrical power was turned on at the time of the official opening on March 4, 1941. The first parts went into production in April and the first assembled engine was completed on October 28, 1941.

Several key personnel moved to Lidcombe from Fishermen's Bend, including: Don Carroll as Assistant Manager, Dan McFarlane as Factory Manager, Sam Bruce as Assistant Factory Manager, Peter Schipper as Engine Superintendent, Charles Rankin as Engine Design Superintendent, Jack Piggott as Tool Superintendent, Ralph Evans as Assistant Tool Superintendent, Cliff Smith as Works Secretary, Gordon Mitchell as Chief Accountant, Ron Ricketts as Supply and Purchasing Officer and Bob Boulton on Engine Assembly and Testing. In addition, Ed H. Fenn was sent from P&W as Chief Engineer under Schipper. The Lidcombe work force initially numbered 298 but with continual expansion, there were 1,968 in June 1942, and 3,262 by June 1943.

The facility was managed by J.N. Kirby (later Sir James), a well known Sydney businessman who offered his services free as his contribution to the war effort. Kirby's experience was invaluable in both setting up the new facility and the day to day work.

In a repeat of the Fishermen's Bend experience, problems of shortages of tooling, materials, material deficiencies and supervision for the work force plagued Lidcombe. In 1941, Norm Tweedle was sent from the Bend to the US to follow up on machine tooling and raw materials supplies. At about this time, Dan McDonald also went to Lidcombe as Chief Inspector.

Problems of workforce supervision caused much unrest in the early days. Several stoppages occurred during 1941, generally as a result of dismissals and usually involving men from the Tool Room. Following one of these dismissals early in 1942, the tension escalated when the Conciliation Commission met on the issue and found in favour of the dismissal. A stop­-work the next day became ugly, with strikers trying to break down the gate in an effort to incite production people to join them. Police were called to restore order and oversee the shift change. A newspaper story the following Monday, January 11, 1942, alleged inefficiencies at the factory and claimed the Americans had gone home because of this. During the upheaval, a further seven men, trying to recruit others, were dismissed as troublemakers.

The next day, Commissioner Morrison called a compulsory conference over the dismissal of the eight men and A. W. Fadden (later Sir Arthur), of the Country Party, was asked by the new Prime Minister, John Curtin, to investigate the inefficiency claims. Fadden met with management and the union. Meanwhile, the Conciliation Court met quickly on the matter, hearing evidence from workers and shop stewards as well as examining 600 folios of written evidence. On Friday the 30th of January, a telegram was received stating:

'Court unable to find any grounds which would justify interfering with employers rights in engagements and dismissal.'

However, this was far from the end of the issue, as on February 2, 1942, Senator Cameron, Minister for Aircraft Production, advised CAC that a Government inquiry would be held into engine manufacture at Lidcombe.

Next day, P. Schelling was requested to resign as Superintendent of Assembly and Testing and was replaced by Bob Boulton.. Schipper and Fenn went to Melbourne for the Inquiry, which began on February 13, and was conducted by Sir Owen Dixon.

During the Inquiry, several changes were made in the running of Lidcombe, including the appointments of:

• Piggott, to take over as Tooling Engineer.

• Goleby, to become Tool Room Superintendent.

• Dibber, appointed as Tool Planning Engineer,

• Taylor, made Department Foreman of Section 10.

The result of the Inquiry was released on Monday April 13, 1942, and an extract from Sir Owen Dixon's Report stated:

I now report that in my opinion the services of E.H. Fenn ought to be retained in the capacity of Chief Engineer at the Lidcombe Aircraft Engine Factory, or in some similar capacity, but that the resignation of P.W. Schipper should be allowed to take effect and no attempt should be made to use his services in that factory or to require the CAC or the DAP to employ him and that the services of P. Schelling ought not to be used in aircraft production in Australia.

Following the Inquiry, Schipper returned to the US to work for P&W.
While the Dixon Report generally put an end to the labour unrest at Lidcombe, technical problems continued.